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Abstract: 
This paper assesses the merits of polycentricity by looking at the water-energy nexus in the 
Spanish irrigation sector. In the last decades, the Spanish electricity and water governance 
systems have transitioned from relatively monocentric, top-down arrangements to 
arrangements that exhibit traits of polycentricity. This paper characterizes both governance 
systems against a series of polycentricity traits and provision and production activities. Then 
the paper assesses the merits of the featured systems against the capacity of water user 
associations (WUAs) to adapt to water and electricity supply dynamics.  The study relies on 
quantitative and archival data collected from a set of 38 irrigation systems located in the 
Northeast of Spain as well as secondary data from the broader water, energy and irrigation 
sectors. As illustrated in the analysis, WUAs can play a key role in integrating the 
management of water and electricity. They do so locally, via a diversity of institutional and 
operational adaptations. This role, however, requires sufficient levels of autonomy, clear rules 
that shape the interactions of WUAS with other water and electricity authorities, and a 
relatively competitive environment. 
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The nexus approach has inherited from the long-standing Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) paradigm a concern over the need to integrate policy decisions across 
sectors and organizations (Benson et al., 2015). However, while the IWRM paradigm 
prescribes the organization of resource management at the river basin scale, the nexus 
approach emphasizes the need of multi-level governance systems. The interest in multi-level 
governance is indeed one of the most genuine features of the nexus approach. As of now, 
however, nexus scholarship has not offered normative principles or theory about how such 
governance shall occur (Benson et al., 2015). This paper aims to start filling the gap by 
introducing polycentricity theory and testing it against the capacity of local authorities to cope 
with water-energy couplings (Scott et al., 2011). For this purpose, the paper unfolds into a 
case study of the way irrigation associations in Spain have adapted to changes in water and 
electricity supply dynamics, and the extent to which their adaptive capacity can be explained 
by polycentricity traits of the broader water and electricity governance systems. 
 
Polycentric governance systems can be distinguished from markets and centralized and 
decentralized governance systems. In markets, individual citizen-consumers are responsible 
for their own provision of goods and services, and each must seek out the producers that 
supply them. In centralized systems, a government makes decisions over the supply of public 
goods and services (e.g., water and energy networks) on behalf of citizens and shall in turn be 
accountable to said citizens-consumers (e.g., via representative democracy). In decentralized 
arrangements, significant amounts of independent legislative and fiscal authority (i.e., 
provision decisions) are allocated to subnational (e.g., regional, local…) governments. In 
polycentric governance systems, different authorities, whether central and local governments, 
agencies, self-governed user groups, firms or other hybrid organizations participate in both 
markets and planning processes horizontally across the territory and vertically across 
geographical scales to co-produce public goods (Ostrom et al., 1993).   
 
Polycentricity theory has been successfully used to make sense of the “organized chaos” of 
metropolitan governance in the US (McGinnis, 1999b; Ostrom et al., 1961). Such “sense-
making”, however, runs the risk of being too normative if applied as a blueprint and not as a 
hypothesis across other contexts. This study relies on and aims to contribute to two research 
strands within polycentricity studies that have mobilized polycentricity theory beyond 
normative claims. The first strand has focused on the merits of polycentric governance as 
compared to centralized and market governance systems (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; 
Baldwin et al., 2015; Galaz et al., 2012; Gruby and Basurto, 2013; Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl-
Wostl, 2012; McCord et al., 2017; McGinnis, 1999a; Ostrom, 2010). In theory, polycentric 
governance systems are more flexible and less vulnerable, reflect local conditions and 
preferences better, and are more conducive to experimentation and learning take place than 
alternative systems (Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Morrison et al., 2017). This study aims to test 
the theory from the perspective of WUAs and their capacity to adapt to water and energy 
crises The second stand is concerned with the conceptualization and operationalization of 
polycentric governance traits. This research responds to several motivations, including a 
concern about the challenges of testing the merits of polycentricity without a clear analytical 
grid (Aligica and Tarko, 2012), the need to distinguish polycentricity from similar paradigms 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Huitema et al., 2009), and an interest in developing theory on 
varieties of polycentric governance (Aligica and Tarko, 2012; Galaz et al., 2012). This strand 
has been much less developed, partially due to the difficulties of constructing a meaningful 
and operational analytical grid. This study aims to contribute to fill the gap by 
operationalizing and expanding Aligica and Tarko’s (2012) framework. 
 
Few scholars have paid systematic attention to the governance of water-energy interactions, 
and even fewer have looked at the efforts made by local self-governed user groups to manage 
water and energy in an integrated manner (Scott et al., 2011; Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2015). 
A paradigmatic example of local such groups are irrigation water user associations (WUAs). 
In the irrigation sector, water is used to produce crops, and energy is used in many cases to 
produce (i.e., withdraw) and distribute water (i.e., via pressurized irrigation technologies). 
Additionally, water can be also used to produce energy (i.e. via turbines in the irrigation 
canals and reservoirs).  Thus, farmers are potentially exposed to both water and energy events 
and policies, and may need to adapt accordingly.  
 
Spain is internationally recognized for the strength of its irrigation sector and long tradition 
and autonomy of its WUAs (Blomquist et al., 2005; Ostrom, 1990). The Spanish irrigation 
sector represents almost a third of the total irrigated area in the European Union. 
Irrigation in Spain accounts for 80% of total farm exports in the country, but also 
consumes 70% (around 21,000 Mm3 in 2013) of total water resources in a typical year 
(Hardy et al., 2012; López-Gunn et al., 2012). In the last 20 years, a series of severe droughts 
and the growth of cities and industry in Spain have resulted in a concern about the 
sustainability of the sector. One of the responses of farmers and WUAs to the new scenario 
has been the transition from flood to sprinkler and drip irrigation. The measure, heavily 
promoted by the government since the early 2000, has in turn aggravated the dependence of 
the sector on energy. The energy consumption share of the sector is not particularly high 
(less than 3% of total energy use; 70% of which is electricity); however, energy 
consumption has been growing without stop for the last 50 years, reaching the peak of 
close to 6,600 GWh in 2007, (Berbel et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2012). The increasing 
dependence of the sector on energy became a problem from the 2008 on, when the 
government eliminated subsidies to electricity prices in the sector as part of its energy 
liberalization reforms.  
 
The water and electricity governance systems in Spain display some traits of polycentricity. 
The water sector resembles a centralized system, i.e. one that centers around the authority of 
River Basin Organizations (RBOs); however, WUAs and other local authorities have strong 
autonomy and are effective integrated in the planning and operations of the RBOs. The 
electricity governance system has been traditionally under the control of the central 
government; in the late 1990s, however, the government introduced competition in the 
production and commercialization stages. 
 
The sections that follow include: an introduction to polycentricity theory (2), a description of 
the methods used to assess polycentricity (3); an overview of the water and electricity 
governance systems in Spain and the WUAs under study (4); an account of the relative 
adaptation capacity of the WUAs against droughts and high electricity prices (5); a discussion 
linking adaptation capacity to polycentricity traits of the water and electricity governance 
systems; and some final reflections (6).  
2. Theory  
Traits of polycentric governance systems 
 
An important distinction associated to the polycentricity paradigm is that between provision 
and production decisions. Provision involves decisions about how much and in which 
qualities to consume and how to organize the payment of production. Production decisions 
include how, when an at which cost to produce the good (Ostrom et al., 1993). Thus, it is not 
necessary that the organizations that make provision decisions are also involved in the 
production of the good. Production decisions can be contracted out to other organizations.  
 
Four key aspects of polycentricity are co-production, local self-governance capacity, 
subsidiarity and coordination (Aligica and Tarko, 2015). Co-production refers to the idea that 
citizens are a key part of the process of providing public goods. Local self-governance, 
whether in the form of “indigenous” communities, cooperative organizations, or local 
governments, can pave the way for co-production. More frequently than not, however, 
decisions by local organizations are undermined by those of higher level organizations. That 
is why polycentricity scholars have also emphasized the importance of the subsidiarity 
principle, according to which any particular task should be decentralized to the lowest level of 
governance with the capacity to conduct it satisfactorily (Marshall, 2008). Finally, there is the 
need of coordination among the different authorities of the system. In this regard, authors 
distinguish polycentric arrangements, which do not include the existence of an overarching set 
of rules that coordinates interactions between the authorities, from polycentric governance 
systems, which do include it (Marshall, 2016).  
Polycentric governance systems and Performance 
 
The adaptation benefits of polycentric governance systems have been highlighted from both 
the transaction cost approach and complexity science. As pointed by Williamson (Williamson, 
2002) hierarchies, or centralized institutional arrangements are good at adaptation when 
changes are sudden and consequences relatively predictable. In those occasions, command-
and-control can quickly promote coordination in the right direction. Alternatively, market and 
decentralized arrangements are good at adaptation in the advent of progressive but uncertain 
changes. In these occasions, the sequential decision making and contracting among a 
multiplicity of agents shall provide for flexibility and learning (Williamson, 2002). 
Polycentric governance systems are decentralized but still coordinated and thus potentially 
combine efficiencies of both markets and hierarchies (Marshall, 2016).  
 
A similar reasoning emerges from a complex systems perspective (Galaz et al., 2012; Wilson, 
2001). The autonomy granted to governmental units, agencies, NGOs, cooperatives firms and 
other organizations within their jurisdictions promotes creativity and entrepreneurship. 
Coordination, in turn, facilitates the adjustment of innovations and learning across such self-
organized processes.   
 
The benefits of polycentric governance systems have been associated to three necessary 
conditions. The first of them is the “active exercise of diverse opinions and preferences” of 
the different authorities within their jurisdictions. The second is the “alignment between rules 
and incentives”, meaning that rules and their consequences are relatively transparent and 
considered useful by the authorities. The third condition is “autonomy”, or the capacity of 
authorities at lower levels to make operational decisions independently from higher levels if 
they wish so (Aligica and Tarko, 2012).  
3. Case study background 
The water sector: multiple provision and production centers around RBOs  
 
Much of the current water governance system in Spain has its origins more than a century 
ago. The Water Act of 1979 and subsequent regulations prescribed the organization of water 
governance into river basin organizations (RBOs) with the goal of guaranteeing reliable water 
production and distribution, mostly for irrigation. This goal was accomplished via the 
establishment of water use rights systems and the planning of big storage and conveyance 
infrastructure (Perez Picazo and Lemeunier, 2000). The Law prescribed a decentralized 
system for irrigation management. Farmers would be granted collective use rights and full 
authority to self-organize into water user associations (WUAs) to distribute the water and 
maintain the infrastructure.  
 
The transition to democracy and growth of cities and industrial poles in the 1970s, and the 
regional decentralization, advent of the environmental discourse and social contestation 
against dam building in the 1980s, all led to a change in the water management paradigm. The 
change materialized in new Water Laws in 1986 and 2001, and a number of subsequent 
reforms aiming to integrate the new interests around water. Currently, both regional and local 
governments, as well as urban and industrial users enjoy, along with the irrigation sector, 
representation and full voting rights in the RBOs. Planning now includes a number of affairs 
other than hydro-agricultural infrastructure building, and is carried through the organization 
of stakeholder participation processes.  
The electricity sector: a differentiated market of buyer and sellers  
 
The energy sector has historically been managed as a public monopoly by the central 
government for both the provision and production of electricity. In the late 1990s the 
government approved a reform to introduce competition in the production, distribution and 
commercialization of electricity. The central government kept the  ownership over the 
distribution grid and the regulatory power (shared with the Congress). A joint public-private 
operator controlled by the central government (Red Electrica Española) rents the distribution 
grid to electricity distribution firms. Retailer firms obtain the energy from electricity 
generation firms in a wholesale energy market and sell it to consumers in a retailer market. 
Currently, there are more than 200 retailer firms {CNMC, 2016 #2328}. The number of 
generation firms has decreased over time, from over 35 in 1990 to only five in 2002 
(Serrallés, 2006). Electricity generation firms are currently the same as the electricity 
distribution firms.  
 
Over time most regional governments have gained authority over energy taxing and planning 
(Jefatura de Estado, 2013). Still the main planning tool is the National Electricity Plan (NEP), 
which is elaborated by the central government (in consultation with the regional 
governments). The plan includes previsions of investments in distribution infrastructure as per 
estimations of electricity demand and supply (MINETAD, 2015).  
The Riegos del Alto Aragon project 
 
The RAA project is a paradigmatic example of the hydro-agricultural policy in the region of 
Aragon, and Spain. It was designed in the early 20th Century and progressively implemented 
over the decades, becoming the largest irrigation project of its kind in the country. The project 
is located in the Ebro river valley (see Appendix 1), and consists of two big canals that divert 
water from the Gállego and Cinca rivers (Ebro tributaries), and convey it to 135,000 has, 115 
small municipalities, 650 cattle ranches and 10 industrial complexes (RRAA, 2012). Irrigation 
is organized into 50 systems (see Appendix 2 for descriptive statistics). Most of them were 
designed to use flood irrigation. In the last decades, however, the government has intensively 
promoted a transition to pressurized irrigation via subsidies. As a result, the area covered by 
pressurized irrigation has increased from less than 20% in the early 2000s to more than 50% 
in 2015 (Villamayor-Tomas, 2016). The most notable increase took place from 2006 to 2009 
(see also Appendix 2). In 2016 (last data officially available), the project consumed 798 Hm3 
of water and around 50Mwh of electricity (RRAA, 2016).  
 
Each of the 50 irrigation systems is managed by a water user association (WUA). The 50 
WUAs are in turn coordinated by an umbrella organization (hereafter the RAA organization). 
The project is supplied by two reservoirs that are managed by the Ebro river Basin 
Organization (E-RBO). The main canals are jointly managed by operators from the E-RBO 
and the RAA organization. Once the water enters into the irrigation systems, it is the 
responsibility of the WUAs to manage it.  
In recent times, the project has been confronted with threats of different kind and the need to 
adapt. Two of the most recent stimuli for adaptation have been the drought of 2005-2006 and 
the financial crisis that followed the government decision to eliminate subsidies to electricity 
use in the sector from 2008 on. 
4. Methods 
 
Methodologically, the analysis included two stages. The first stage consisted on the 
assessment of the responses that the WUAs under study have developed to cope with water 
and electricity supply crises. Qualitative data were obtained via semi-structured interviews as 
well as through the revision of secondary documents (i.e., mostly yearly reports elaborated by 
the WUAs) and used to identify how WUAs have responded to the 2005-2006 drought and 
the rise in electricity prices; and the extent to which they have relied on other authorities for 
that purpose. A total of 23 interviews were carried out with officials from the WUAs, RAA 
organization, the E-RBO, and the National Federation of Irrigation Associations 
(FENACORE). Quantitative  data on water and electricity use was obtained from the WUAs 
and the RAA organization, and processed to explore the extent to which the WUAs have 
successfully coped with the disturbances. Adaptation to droughts, was assessed by looking at 
“irrigation performance”, which was computed as a ratio between water available  and crop 
water needs in the RAA project (Villamayor-Tomas, 2014).  Adaptation to the rise in 
electricity prices was evaluated by looking at the evolution of the electricity costs generated in 
the project, i.e., whether WUAs and the RAA organization were able to contain such costs 
and decouple them from changes in electricity prices. The choice of these two outcome 
variables was suggested by farmers themselves. 
 
The second stage consisted on a characterization of the water and electricity governance 
systems through the polycentricity lenses1. The characterization relied on the framework 
developed by Aligica and Tarko (2012). According to these authors the “active exercise of 
diverse opinions and preferences”, the “alignment between rules and incentives” and 
“autonomy” are core factors of performing polycentric governance systems. Additionally, 
there are number of other factors that are not necessary but still important for performance 
(Aligica and Tarko, 2012) (see Figure 1). Those factors allow observers to distinguish 
varieties of polycentricity, and can help move current research from a narrow comparison 
between “polycentric vs. monocentric systems” to an exploration of the conditions under 
different polycentric governance systems perform better. 
Figure 1. Logical structure of polycentricity: traits for assessment 
 
Note: P1, P2 and P3 are necessary conditions of performing polycentric governance systems.  
Source: Aligica and Tarko (2012). 
 
As an innovation to Aligica and Tarko’s analytical grid, this study added the distinction 
between provision and production of public goods. Thus the 10 polycentricity traits (i.e., P1-
                                                          
1 This study understands water and energy networks as public goods of relatively similar characteristics 
(Kimmich 2013).  
P3, and A-G from Figure 1) were used to feature the water and electricity governance systems 
both with regard to production and provision decisions (see Table 1 and Appendix 3).  
 
Table 1. Guiding questions to assess polycentricity traits  
Autonomous centers of authority 
P1. Active exercise of 
opinions 
Do authorities (e.g., WUAs) have the capacity to collectively make and implement 
provision/production decisions within their jurisdictions? (Yes/No) 
P2. Autonomy  Do authorities have  autonomy to make autonomous provision/production decisions in 
their jurisdictions? Is the decision making capacity of local authorities (e.g., WUAs) 
complemented (and not undermined) by higher level authorities? (Yes/No) 




Do authorities consider useful the overarching set of rules that shape their incentives 
and interactions? Is the connection between rules, behavior and consequences clear for 
all authorities? (Yes/No) 
B. Rule design Are the decisions to design/reform the overarching set of rules taken by 
insiders/outsiders of the system? 
C. Jurisdiction Are the jurisdictions of authorities territorial/non-territorial? 
D. Collective choice How are decisions among multiple authorities taken? (majority rule, consensus, 
individually) 
Evolutionary competition 
E. Entry Is the entry of new authorities in the sector merit based/free/spontaneous?  
F. Exit Is the exit of authorities in the sector merit based/free/spontaneous?  
G. Information Is relevant information for provision/production decision making public (shared 
among all authorities) or private? 
Based on: Aligica and Tarko (2012) and Marshall (2008) 
 
Associations between capacity of the WUAs to cope with the water and electricity crises and 
polycentricity traits of the water and electricity governance system were drawn via 
comparison.  
5. Results: Adaptive capacity in the Riegos del Alto Aragon project  
Adapting to (the 2005-2006) drought  
 
In the last 20 years a series of severe droughts in Spain have seriously threatened the 
sustainability of the irrigation sector (Roldán, 2007). The drought of 2005-2006 (see Figure 2) 
was particularly severe in the Ebro basin and the Gallego-Cinca sub-basin. The Water Law 
gives priority to urban uses over irrigation and industrial users, meaning that the RRA project, 
main non-urban user in the Gallego-Cinca sub-basin, was confronted with the need to reduce 
consumption drastically. 
 
The 2005-2006 drought triggered responses at all levels of governance in a relatively 
coordinated fashion. At the sub-basin level, the E-RBO held meetings with representatives of 
the RAA project and other user groups to allocate the water proportionally to each group’s 
rights. To distribute the allocated water across WUAs, the RAA organization implemented a 
transferable quota policy and also strengthened monitoring efforts (Villamayor-Tomas, 2014). 
To manage the quotas, the WUAs used a diversity of measures, including  “emergency” water 
allocation rules, strengthened monitoring mechanisms, and the temporal use of wells and 
reuse of drained water. The authorization to use the drainage system was granted by the RAA 
organization, while the right to use the wells was given by the E-RBO. The quotas were 
transferable so a farmer with land in two WUAs could request water to be sent from one 
WUA to another. Thus, many farmers ended up concentrating their water rights in the systems 
that enjoyed higher water productivities, i.e., dominated by sprinkler irrigation and high 
water-demand crops (see table in Appendix 5). 
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of total water available, average water received, average water needs 
and average performance in the RAA systems (2004–2007) 
 
n=38 
Note: The base year for water availability and irrigation performance (right Y axis) is 2004 Water availability is 
based on reservoir inflows. Water received is the total water sent by the Ebro RBO to the RAA irrigation project. 
Water needs are estimated based on crops cultivated in each of the irrigation districts within the RAA project. 
Irrigation performance was computed as an averaged ratio between water received and water needs at the 
irrigation district level. A decrease in the performance indicates that farmers were less able than usual (i.e, 2004) 
in adjusting their water needs to water availability.  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the E-RBO and Villamayor-Tomas (2014). 
 
To compensate farmers for their water conservation efforts, the E-RBO cancelled the water 
fee they charge to the WUAs. Also, the regional and central governments mediated with the 
EU to lessen the conditions under which farmers can receive the European Common 
Agricultural Policy subsidies. The central government also approved a series of Royal 
Drought Decrees that provided a selection of RBOs, including the E-RBO, with budget and 
regulatory power to invest in emergency supply and water efficiency infrastructure, enable 
temporal water markets and look for alternative water sources, among other operations 
(Hernandez Mora et al., 2012; Sánchez et al., 2006). Permanent Drought Commissions, 
including representatives of basin authorities, regional, local and user authorities, were 
responsible for following implementation of the Decrees. The government subsidies to 
promote pressurized irrigation can be also understood as a measure to adapt to droughts 
(Lecina et al., 2010; MAGRAMA, 2015). Many WUAs in the RAA project used the subsidies 
to build in-system pools and pave ditches. Many others invested in pumped irrigation.   
 
Overall, the joint actions taken by the E-RBO and RAA organization contributed to build 
adaptation capacity and buffer the effects of the drought. Despite the 60% decrease in water 
availability, “irrigation performance” only decreased by 20% (see Figure 2). (Villamayor-
Tomas, 2014). 
 
Struggling with (the 2008-to date) electricity price crisis 
 
The year 2008 set the start of an electricity and financial crisis in the irrigation sector that still 
continues. Traditionally the sector had benefited from a reduced (i.e., subsidized) electricity 
tariff but, in 2008 the tariff was eliminated and the sector had to face actual market prices, 
which had been progressively increasing since the liberalization reform. Additionally, the 
government decided to introduce changes in the market price structure, making electricity 
more expensive in summer time (peak of irrigation campaign) and some periods of the week 
(e.g., weekends). As a result of all these changes, electricity costs in many Spanish irrigation 
systems increased dramatically (Berbel et al., 2014; García de Durango, 2014; RRAA, 2009). 
In 2008, 16 out of the 50 WUAs in the RAA project applied sprinkler irrigation (55,000 
hectares, 41% of the irrigable area). An internal study carried out by the RAA for a selection 
of those WUAs in 2008 estimated an increase of 50% in electricity consumption and more 
than 150% in the electricity bill from 2005 to  2009 .  A detailed look at those numbers 
illustrates the influence of the rising electricity prices on the electricity bill (Figure 3b), even 
if partially mediated by water –and energy- use (see decrease of the electricity bill from 2007 
to 2008, in Figures 3a and 3b). Electricity use grew at This put the RAA project in a difficult 
situation and triggered a number of responses.  
 
Figure 3. Evolution of water and electricity use, and electricity price and bill for a 
sample of irrigation systems with RAA project. 
a      b   
 
n=5  
Note: Production and consumption are measured in Gigawatts per hour (left Y axis in graph a). The cost of 
electricity use (right Y axis on both graphs) is the result of first multiplying the electricity consumption times the 
price of electricity paid in the project  (left Y axis in graph b), and then adding it to a fix cost that depends on the 
power term contracted.  
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the E-RBO. 
 
 
One of the first responses of most of the WUAS in the RAA project and elsewhere to the 
crisis was the redesign of irrigation schedules to fit the  periods when electricity prices are 
lower.  A number of WUAs also commissioned electricity audits to better estimate their 
consumption and adjust their contracts with  retailer companies accordingly. A few WUAs 
were also able to sign contracts with electricity retailer companies just for the irrigation 
campaign  (otherwise WUAs are obliged to contract electricity for the full year).  
 
The RAA organization has played an important role to facilitate the implementation of 
efficiency measures. The organization has organized informative meetings and workshops 
regularly and also promoted a real-time online system for data collection on water and 
electricity use. Additionally, the RAA organization has coordinated the collective bargaining 
and contracting of energy between the WUAs and the retailer companies to reduce costs 
(RRAA, 2010). According to estimations by the National Federation of Irrigation 
Associations (FENACORE), collective bargaining could save the ensemble of Spanish 
irrigation communities around €56M (FENACORE, 2013); however, the scaling up of 
collective bargaining should not be taken for granted. Neither WUAs nor second order 
organizations like the RAA enjoy a “Public Administration” status in the energy sector that 
would allow them, for example, to have first-hand access to information compiled by the 
regional and central governments, enjoy enforcement authority for electricity-related affairs 
within their jurisdictions, or be compensated for investments in the distribution infrastructure 
in case of contract failure.  
 
The other key role played by the RAA organization has to do with the strategic use of 
electricity production capacity. The RAA project counts on 7 turbines located in the main 
canals of the project. To recover costs, the RAA organization had been selling the energy at 
market prices (before the crisis it did it at a flat, regulated rate). To be registered as an 
electricity generator, the RAA organization has to commit with the government to a particular 
amount and timing of supply, which requires a careful planning of irrigation to guarantee 
constant water flows into the turbines.  
 
Additionally, the RAA organization has explored the option of using its production capacity 
for self-consumption (Retema, 2015). The amount of electricity produced is rather sufficient 
to satisfy the needs of all WUAs on average, but it fluctuates a lot from year to year (see 
Figure 4.a). Moreover, there are institutional barriers. Auto-production make sense in the 
context of “net balance” systems, which allow auto-producers to deliver energy surpluses to 
the grid in exchange of discounts in the electricity bill or of energy during periods of 
production deficit (Energia y Sociedad, 2014); however, current regulations do not 
contemplate that option. Also, according to a Royal Decree signed in 2015, auto-producers 
have to pay a tax associated with the public maintenance of the distribution system regardless 
of the use they make of the grid (BOE, 2015), and it is forbidden that auto-producers self-
organize to pool production and demand. This context stays in stark contrast with that of 
many other European countries, where the system of Net Balance not only is allowed but also 
promoted (EC, 2015; Ropenus and Skytte, 2005). 
Figure 4. Evolution of total electricity production, consumption, cost and prices in the 
RAA project 
a      b 
 
Note 1: 2011 is the year when  most of the measures developed by the RAA organization and WUAs were fully 
implemented. 
Note 2: The cost of electricity use (right Y axis on both graphs) is the result of first multiplying the electricity 
consumption times the price of electricity paid in the RAA project (left Y axis in graph b) and then adding it to a 
fix cost that depends on the power term contracted.  
Source: Own elaboration based on data obtained from the RAA organization 
 
Overall, the measures of the WUAs and the RAA organization had some effect although 
maybe not as much as needed. As shown in Figure 4.a, the increase in electricity consumption 
has decelerated. The electricity produced in the project amounts to around 46Mwh/year on 
average since 2011 which is very close to the averaged electricity consumption for the same 
period (48Mwh/year). That said, electricity production is quite volatile (standard deviation of 
8Mwh/year and range of  24Mwh/year over the period). More importantly, the influence of 
electricity prices on electricity costs is still quite strong  (Figure 4.b), which illustrates the 
pervading vulnerability of the project to market dynamics.  
 
Supplementary to the measures taken by the WUAs and the RAA organization, there are also 
actions implemented by the regional, basin and national authorities. The E-RBO has sold the 
hydroelectricity produced in the basin to WUAs at reduced prices (CHE, 2015).  At some 
point, the government of Aragon also explored with WUAs the construction of large scale, 
renewable energy projects within the systems; however, the lack of sufficient funding and a 
sudden decision by the central government to cut subsidies to renewable energy production, 
prevented the venture from materializing (RRAA, 2010). Finally, the central government has 
also implemented electricity tax and price deductions (RRAA, 2012), funded programs to 
disseminate measures to increase energy efficiency in the irrigation sector, and initiated some 
planning measures to better integrate irrigation and energy policies  (Mayor et al., 2015; 
Rocamora et al., 2008). 
 
A number of the measures put in place by the government were implemented in response to 
the lobbying activities carried by the RAA organization in Aragon and the FENACORE in 
Spain. These included from formal complaints to demonstrations and meetings with 
politicians. Despite the changes, there are a number of other requests that the government has 
resisted to make, such as giving priority to WUAs in the approval process for electricity 
production, more flexibility in the contracting of power term, further tax reductions, a special 
tariff for the irrigation sector, or the suppression of the tax to self-production.  
6. Discussion 
 
WUAs in Spain operate in the interface of a water governance system and electricity 
governance system. Both systems display traits of polycentricity but not necessarily the same 
(see Table 3). A comparison of those traits can help to understand why the RAA project 
WUAs have tended to cope better with droughts than with the rise of electricity prices. .   
Differences that explain WUA adaptive capacity across the water and energy sectors 
 
Relevant differences in polycentricity traits across the water and electricity sectors 
concentrate mostly on the production activities, and are related to the autonomy (exercise of 
diverse interests, formal authority and subsidiarity) granted to the WUAs, the clarity and 
openness to WUA participation of regulations and policies, and the degree to which 
evolutionary competition (i.e., via proper information sharing and lack of entry barriers) is 
guaranteed.  
 
WUAs display in both the drought and electricity crises a diversity of adaptation responses 
(see Active exercise of diverse interests in Table 3 and Appendix 4 for a detailed account of 
the evidence). Some of those responses are adjusted to the specific features of each irrigation 
system and carried out by the WUAs themselves (i.e., different irrigation rules and schedules 
depending on irrigation technology). Other responses have been developed and carried out by 
the RAA organization (e.g., transferable quota policy, collective bargaining with electricity 
generators).  In comparative perspective, the responses were less diverse  in the electricity 
crisis than in the water crisis. To cope with the rise in electricity prices, WUAs focused 
exclusively on demand management measures (e.g., adjustment of irrigation schedules); 
however, to cope with the drought, WUAs used both demand and supply (new sources of 
water) measures.   
 
Table 3. Polycentricity traits in the water and electricity sectors from the perspective of 
WUAs 
 Water Energy 
 Provision Production Provision Production 
Autonomous centers      




Yes  No 
 
P2. Autonomy: Formal authority & 
subsidiarity 
Yes & Yes 
 
Yes & Yes 
 
Yes & Yes 
 
No & No 
 







Overarching rules     
P3. Clear consequences of rules  Yes  Yes 
 
No  No  
 




Outsider  Insider  
C. Jurisdiction  Territorial  Territorial  Territorial  Territorial & 
Non-territorial 







Evolutionary competition     
E. Entry Merit based 
 
Merit based Free  Merit based  
F. Exit  Constrained  
 
Constrained Constrained Free  
G. Information  Public Public Public Private  
 
 
The diversity of local strategies can be related to the autonomy of the WUAs to organize 
affairs within their jurisdictions (see Autonomy: Formal authority in Table 3). The 
associations are owners of their own irrigation infrastructure and enjoy rights over provision 
activities (i.e., planning and financing), as well as production activities (e.g., water extraction, 
allocation, enforcement and conflict-solving) within their jurisdictions. Additionally, the 
WUAs are formally recognized as Public Administration authorities, which  grants them with 
access to special sanctioning and conflict solving mechanisms, first-hand information about 
water availability, and procedures to pool water rights, to mention a few. None of these 
privileges hold when WUAs have to manage electricity. This not only hampers local initiative 
but also hinders successful ventures (e.g., collective contracting and production) to scale up. 
 
In both the water and electricity crises, the governments have played a subsidiary role 
(Autonomy: Subsidiarity), but this is much more patent in the water situation. In both crises 
the WUAs have benefited from information and economic resources provided by the E-RBO 
and governments at different scales. Additionally, the WUAs have benefited from important 
“modernization” subsidies and the support of the E-RBO in the coordination of water 
allocation within the sub-basin and monitoring of the quota policy. As pointed by the RAA 
organization and FENACORE, such a level of governmental support would be desired  to 
better cope with the electricity situation (RRAA, 2012). 
 
Another relevant difference between the water and electricity governance systems has to do 
with the clarity of the regulations that govern interactions between the WUAs and other actors 
(Overarching rules: Clear consequences). In the water situation, rules (e.g., priority of urban 
rights over irrigation rights, water allocation and drought management rules) are clear and 
accepted by the WUAs. In the electricity sector the decisions by the central government to 
organize the electricity market and the setting of prices have been contested by WUAs and 
other actors of the sector in different occasions. Also, the government has reformed the 
system in numerous occasions and this has aggravated the uncertainty generated around the 
cost of electricity and the feasibility of long term investments. The failed attempt by the RAA 
(in partnership with the regional government of Aragon) to invest in renewables illustrates the 
point. 
 
Also, there are differences in the level of participation of WUAs in resource allocation 
decisions (Overarching rules: Collective choice). On the one hand, the WUAs, represented by 
the RAA organization, enjoy full voting rights in the E-RBO. Such rights are shared with 
other water user groups and grant the WUAs with a voice in the reservoir release and right 
reallocation decisions. On the other hand, decisions in the electricity sector are made via the 
market. Here, the provision side is quite atomized; however, the production side is rather 
oligopolistic, with a handful of firms dominating both the generation and distribution stages. 
This not only goes in detriment of the bargaining power of WUAs (indeed forcing them to act 
collectively), but undermines also the capacity of the system to evolve (see next section).  
 
The two systems are also different with regard to Evolutionary Competition. In both sectors, 
new production activities (i.e., the use of new water sources, or the building of new power 
plants) require the approval by the government. In the electricity sector, however, the 
participation of WUAs as producers in the market (Evolutionary Competition: Entry) is 
hampered by taxes and the lack of distribution infrastructure. Also information about 
availability and prices is more accessible in the water than in the electricity sector 
(Evolutionary Competition: Information). Information of water availability estimations, 
storage and demand is easily accessible online. Similarly, the fees charged to the water users 
by the three RBOs are announced every year by March and opened to amendment proposals 
by users.  Alternatively, the structure of the price of electricity is quite complex, involving a 
number of components, fees and restrictions that have been updated from year to year with 
limited preannouncement and publicity. Additionally, supply contracts made by retailer 
companies vary depending on the deals reached between the companies and the end user (e.g., 
WUAs), which aggravates the opacity to the retailer market. Such opacity adds to the lack of 
public forecasts of power supply and demand, making contracting particularly difficult and 
subject to abuses (Garrido, 2017).  
Similar barriers to adaptation in the water and electricity sectors  
 
An aspect that is similar in both the water and electricity governance systems and points to 
adaptation issues is the over-allocation of “production rights” and the difficulties to 
rationalize them (Evolutionary Competition: Exit). On the one hand, there is an issue of 
under-used water use rights in the irrigation sector (e.g., in the Ebro basin). This is due to a 
progressive process of land abandonment and concentration of irrigation activities in the 
hands of professional farmers who are heavily investing in water efficient irrigation 
technologies (CESA, 2012). The central government launched the program “Alberca” to 
adjust water use rights to actual water uses and efficiencies (MAGRAMA, 2012). The 
program has made some progress; however, this has been mostly accomplished by targeting 
abandoned agricultural land and outdated water uses such as old mills. A full update of those 
rights would facilitate adaptation planning in the sector and across sectors; however, RBOs 
lack the means to accomplish such a comprehensive update, and it is unlikely that landowners 
who invested in new irrigation technologies to increase productivity are going to give away 
their rights easily.  
 
In the electricity sector, there is an excess production capacity of 40% and this has created a 
problem of financial sustainability. The central government is in charge, among other 
operations, of maintaining the distribution system, subsidizing renewable electricity 
production, and compensating fossil fuel generators for maintaining a number plants 
operational as a back-up when climatic conditions for solar and wind production are not 
suitable. All this should be financed via fees to electricity distribution and consumption; 
however the revenue is not sufficient to offset the costs of such an oversized system.  
Successive increases in the electricity fees (which partially explain the electricity price crisis) 
have not been sufficient and, as a result, the government has accumulated a debt with fossil 
fuel power generators that grows year after year. The lobby of generators has opposed the 
debt-accumulation strategy and claimed for financing the deficit via higher fees and the public 
budget, but the government has resisted due to obvious political costs. Until now, and despite 
warnings from the EU (Rejon, 2017), the central government has not only ignored the option 
of closing fossil-fuel power plants down but also kept the compensation payments to many of 
those plants under the argument that they provide a necessary back up to the system.  
 
As it happens, the government does not have information about the maintenance and 
operation costs actually incurred by fossil fuel generators and lacks legal tools to force them 
to reveal that information (Evolutionary competition: information).  Having this information 
would not only facilitate an update of the actual costs of the system and a revision of the 
compensation payments, but would also make using the public budget to pay the deficit 
politically more feasible.  
 
More generally, the production capacity stalemate in the electricity sector can be associated to 
the strong lobby of generators (Overarching rules: rule design/redesign). Generators are not 
only entitled to the compensation payments, but also benefit from a peculiar system to set 
market prices. Whole sale market prices are set at the cost of the most expensive electricity 
sources, which are coal and gas. This mechanism guarantees returns to capital to generators 
but has the consequence of rising prices as demand increases. Also, it provides incentives to 
generators to artificially inflate prices by restricting supply, as has already happened in the 
past (El Pais, 2015). Overall, the benefits of generators have grown at an average of around 
3.3% since the reform of the sector (Energia y Sociedad, 2012). 
 
The irrigation (i.e. farming) lobby has lost much of its influence over water governance 
decisions (Downward and Taylor, 2007), and this has forced the sector to adapt. That said, 
irrigators are still quite powerful.Not without reason, for example, the Drought Decrees 
included important investments in water supply infrastructure and infrastructure improvement 
subsidies for the irrigation sector (BOE, 2005). Although positive and probably necessary, 
such a focus on technological fixes, has brought many WUAs into a dynamic of water an 
energy intensification of uncertain results (see next discussion section below). 
Local institutional interplays across sectors  
 
The RAA project case also illustrates the relevance of institutional interplays in several ways. 
First, the current vulnerability of WUAs to the rise in electricity prices partially owes to  the 
massive promotion of pressurized irrigation by the government in the past decade with the 
aim of increasing the robustness of the sector to droughts (López-Gunn et al., 2012). As 
indicated by interviewees, many farmers welcomed the program quite enthusiastically as an 
opportunity to reduce maintenance costs  and/or increase water productivity (not necessarily 
conserve it); others were progressively bought into the “modernization” programs by public 
consulting firms and contractors, and WUA leaders The “modernization” subsidies reached 
up to 60% of total projects costs in many cases (MAPA, 2001). Overall more than 8,800ME 
were invested in the program, including both public and private funds (Aunion, 2014).  
 
Second, the dependence of the irrigation sector on electricity and its vulnerability to 
electricity prices could be ameliorated if the water efficiency improvements were 
accompanied by a thorough revision of water use rights in the sector. The new pressurized 
technologies have not always translated in water savings due to now well-known rebound 
effects (Berbel et al., 2015) . In the Ebro basin, improvements in water productivity did not 
offset the expansion of irrigated land or the intensification of irrigation, resulting in net water 
use increases and/or decreases in irrigation returns (Lecina et al., 2010). More efforts from 
water use authorities (including WUAs) to rationalize water use rights could ameliorate said 
rebound effects; however, it is important to note that the effects are the result of complex 
dynamics and motivations (Dumont et al., 2013). As illustrated in the RAA project (see 
Appendix 4), droughts may end up concentrating water use in those systems that are sprinkler 
irrigation-dominated, and thus electricity use-intensive. Also, farmers may not be interested at 
all in reducing water use even if that would decrease electricity costs or future water 
availability. As pointed above, one should not assume that farmers invested in infrastructure 
improvements to conserve water. Moreover, as also indicated by interviewees, reducing water 
use is not an option for farmers who still have to pay the bill of such investments.  
 
Third, a number of the electricity management measures developed by the WUAs to cope 
with the price crisis owes to the WUA’s autonomy and capacity for collective water 
management. The rescheduling of irrigation, collective bargaining  and electricity production 
are clear examples of it. The capacity to adjust irrigation schedules owes to the authority of 
the WUAs over water allocation affairs. Compliance by farmers with the schedules is not 
trivial. Farmers that do not depend on electricity shall resist to such adjustments. Also, the 
electricity bill in each district is shared by all irrigators equally regardless of when they 
irrigate. The common history of cooperation for water management among farmers and the 
active monitoring of water use carried by the WUA staff paved the way for cooperation in this 
occasion.  A similar logic applies in the case of collective bargaining and electricity 
production. The RAA organization does not have authority to enforce collective electricity 
use and production contracts. Overuse and underproduction are penalized in the market. Thus, 
it is important that the RAA organization makes reliable estimations of electricity needs and 
production capacity, which require cooperation among all WUAs. Again, the prevalence of a 
common understanding of the benefits of cooperation in this context contributed to the 
success of the initiative. 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study advances our understanding of institutional problems and solutions in the 
management of water-energy interactions by introducing and testing polycentricity theory.  
 
According to the findings, Water User Associations (WUAs) can play a key role in integrating 
the management of water and electricity. They do so mostly locally, via a diversity of 
institutional and operational adaptations. That said, such integrative capacity depends on 
features of the broader governance context. In the RAA case, WUAs showed a lower capacity 
to adapt to electricity supply dynamics (i.e., rise in electricity prices) than to water supply 
dynamics (i.e., droughts), and this can be traced back to differences in polycentricity traits 
across the water and electricity sectors. As far as the comparison of the two sectors shows, the 
adaptive capacity of WUAs (and seemingly other local water-energy user groups), requires 
sufficient levels of autonomy, clear rules that structure interactions with other water and 
electricity authorities, and a relatively competitive environment.  
 
The above findings align with previous studies showing the advantages of polycentric 
governance in certain contexts (Baldwin et al., 2015; Binder et al., 2013; Herrfahrdt-Pähle and 
Pahl-Wostl, 2012). Additionally, this study links those advantages to specific polycentricity 
traits, illustrating  the existence of different varieties of polycentric governance and thus 
potential paths to adaptive capacity. Most of the empirical works on polycentricity to date 
have tended to assess polycentricity as differences in degree (“more or less polycentric”) and 
rather ignored the exploration of differences in kind (different types of polycentricity). Such 
tendency has in turn reinforced a rather unsophisticated view of polycentricity and its 
benefits. In response, this study has featured two governance systems as representing different 
configurations of polycentricity traits. As shown, many of the differences across the two 
configurations relate to the way production activities are arranged. Whether these 
configurations actually reflect more general types is a question for further research. Such 
“configurational” research is important from the perspective of water-energy nexus research. 
Water-energy trade-offs and synergies are a good illustration of the complexity and 
idiosyncratic nature of human-environmental interactions. Addressing such complexity is an 
imperative for the advancement of water-energy nexus governance scholarship and social 
environmental science more generally; however, such goal should not jeopardize the ultimate 
interest of accumulating knowledge and building relatively generalizable theory (Cox, 2008). 
As illustrated here, the “polycentricity traits” lenses offer a way to start moving in that 
direction.  
 
The above reflection has also significant policy implications. The Spanish water sector 
displays more polycentric traits that the electricity sector, but this does not mean that the 
water governance system is a panacea or that it should be just copied and pasted as a blueprint 
in the electricity sector. Although similar in some respects, each sector has also its own 
history and challenges. The water governance system has gained in transparency and diversity 
of interests and authorities over time. Although highly reliant on the coordinating and 
planning role of RBOs, the autonomy and voice of local authorities (i.e. WUAs) and thus their 
adaptive capacity have so far been guaranteed; however,  a policy challenge remains in the 
adjustment of water use rights  to increases in water use efficiencies so investments and 
subsidies in infrastructure investments ameliorate and not aggravate the trade-off between 
water use efficiency and  electricity costs. The electricity governance system was reformed to 
operate as a spot market, and has increasingly hosted local production and consumption 
initiatives where the pricing system is substituted by cooperation and planning The scaling up 
of these initiatives and other adaptations will likely depend on the authority granted to the 
cooperative actors that feature them as well as on the capacity of the government to improve 
transparency and remove market barriers in the sector.  
 
Also, the study shows important institutional interplays across the water and energy sectors, 
and the potential of moving beyond the single-sector analyses that have so far dominated the 
polycentricity scholarship. The role played by the WUAs to cope with the electricity crisis 
cannot be understood without looking at the autonomy and capacity for cooperation they 
enjoy in the water governance system. At the same time, the progressive concentration of 
production capacity in the Spanish electricity sector and the influence of generators on 
regulatory decisions have jeopardized the WUAs’ efforts to decouple their electricity bill 
from electricity price dynamics . These interplays illustrate ongoing tensions between 
polycentricity and centralization forces. As pointed by Aligica and Tarko (2012) “the 
structure and dynamics of a polycentric system is a function of the presence of polycentrism 
in the governance of the other related and adjoined systems… any island of polycentric order 
entails and presses for polycentricism in other areas, creating a tension toward change in its 
direction” (p. 247). Further research on such cross-sector tensions can notably contribute to 
expand polycentricity theory, and  water-energy nexus studies are particularly well 
positioned for that purpose. 
 
To conclude, the study of varieties of polycentricity and their performance is probably the 
most promising inroad to further theory building around polycentricity. Progress on this 
matter has been hindered for quite long by the lack of  effective analytical grids. This study 
has aimed to fill the gap by operationalizing Aligica and Tarko’s (2012) framework in the 
context of water and energy governance and adding a distinction between provision and 
production activities. Further methodological and theoretical steps shall include the 
development of additional polycentricity traits, the use of more fine grained measuring scales 
of those traits, or the development of propositions about interactions between traits within and 
across sectors.   
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Appendix 1. Location of RAA project 
 
Appendix 2: Averaged descriptive statistics of irrigation systems within RAA project 
(2001-2010) 
 Mean sd Min Max 
Area of system (has) 2,395 1,856 142 9,797 
Number of farmers 140 88 11 399 
Average plot size (has) 40 24 7 148 
Percentage of sprinkler irrigation 26% 36% 9% 100% 
Summer crops (has) 64 15 22 93 
Winter crops (has) 24 13 1 69 
Fallow (has) 11 8 1 50 
Source: Own elaboration with data obtained from RAA organization 
Presence of sprinkler irrigation in the RAA project over time 
  
Note: the measure is an averaged percentage across irrigation systems 
 
Appendix 3: Guiding questions to assess provision and production decisions in the 
irrigation sector 
 General question Decisions in the irrigation context 
  Water Electricity 
Provision 
decisions 
How much water/energy 
should be consumed? 
Allocation of water use rights; 
cropping 
Electricity contracting 
 How should the production and 
distribution of water/electricity 
be financed? 
Financing of infrastructure 
(reservoirs, canals, in-system 
pools, pumping stations…) 
Financing of electricity 
generation plants and 
distribution grid 
 When/how should 
water/electricity be consumed? 
Water allocation within sector 
and across sectors 
Amount, timing and 
intensity of pumping 
 Which qualities of 
water/electricity should be 
prioritized? 




How should water/electricity 
be produced? 
Design, construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure   
Construction and 
maintenance of power 
plants and distribution grid  
 When should the 
water/electricity be produced? 
Operations management of 
infrastructure  
Operations management 
of plants and distribution 
grid 









Appendix 4. Polycentricity traits in the Water and Electricity governance systems from the perspective of WUAs 
 Water Energy 
 Provision Production Provision Production 
Autonomous centers  
P1. Active 
exercise of 
diverse interests   
Yes 
From quota policy to land 
leveling or investments in 
sprinkler/drip irrigation 




Temporal reliance on wells and 
drainage canals; investment on in-
system pools  
Reduction of crop loses 
Yes  
From collective electricity 
contracting to audits and 
irrigation rescheduling  




WUAs have limited capacity 
as generators; electricity 
produced by RAA is sold in 
the market 






Self-organization of water 
use among farmers and across 
WUAs (see RAA); Public 
Administration status of 
WUAs 
Reduced water use during 
droughts 
Yes 
Water distribution carried by 
WUAs within their jurisdiction; 
Public Administration status of 
WUAs  
 Satisfactory implementation of 
quota policy; adjustment of 
irrigation to electricity prices 
Yes 
WUAs can self-organize 
into electricity retailer 
cooperatives  




WUAs can produce and sell 
based on their choice energy 
and mode of production; 
however, pooling of 
electricity and net balance 






Central and regional 
government subsidies for 
infrastructure improvements  




Monitoring and information 
sharing by RBO; drought 
emergency supply investments by 
central government; approvals for 
temporary use of wells and 
drainage canals by RBO and 
RAA 
 Satisfactory implementation of 
quota policy; reduction of crop 
loses  
Yes 
Preferential selling of 
electricity by RBO; tax 
reductions and training on 
efficiency by governments 
Reduction in electricity 
bill 
No 
Failed partnerships between 
WUAs and regional 
governments due to lack of 
funding  
A. Goals Common 
Efficient and equitable water 
allocation across uses 
Common & Individual 
Efficient and equitable water 
allocation across uses; maximize 
net capital return  
Common 
Efficient and equitable 
electricity allocation across 
uses 
Individual 
Maximize net  capital return  








Clear priority ranking of 
water uses; transparent water 
use rights system 
Lack of conflict between 
RAA and other uses, and 
within RAA during droughts 
Yes 
Drought protocol at RBO level 






Market regulation agency is 
not independent: opaque 
and volatile decisions 
 Uncertainty and 
controversy around pricing 
system; 2008 shock  
No  
Lobbying activities carried 
by energy 
generators/distributors 
 Uncertainty and 
controversy around auto-
production rules  
B. Rule design 
and redesign  
Outsider   
European Water Directive 
and Spanish Water Law 
questioning water supply and 
hydro-agricultural paradigms. 
Push for adaptation to 
increase water use efficiency 
and conservation 
Insider  
Pervasive supply infrastructure 
subsidies; massive pressurized 
irrigation subsidies; difficulties to 
rationalize water use rights  
Many WUAs locked in 




European Energy Directive 
and central government 
Electricity reform; 
Regulatory agency but 
questioned independence 
from Department of 
Industry; sanctions to 
generators due to collusion 
Insider 
Pervasive subsidies to fossil 
fuel generation  
 Constrained competition 
and rationalization of system 
 
C. Jurisdiction  Territorial  Territorial  Territorial  Territorial & Non-territorial 
D. Collective 
choice  
Majority rule  
WUAs and other user groups 
have full vote rights in 
reservoir release commission 
and in operations committees 
at sub-basin level.  
 Satisfactory 
apportionment of reservoir 
waters between RAA project 
and other uses and 
(None) 
Water use rights system is 
managed by the RBOs officials 
Individual 







 bargaining power of 
generators/distributors 
implementation of quota 
policy 
Evolutionary competition 
E. Entry  Merit based 
Mandatory formation of 
WUAs for the management 
of collective use rights; 
irrigation water use rights are 
linked to land ownership; 
WUAs have to be recognized 
by basin authorities 
Merit based 
Water production (wells, 
diversions) by WUAs are subject 
right concession approval by the 
RBO 
Free  
(but transaction costs) 
 WUA collective 
bargaining 
Merit based  
Need of approval by 
government and binding 
forecast of production 
capacity; tax to self-
production, lack of 
distribution infrastructure, 
transaction costs, experience 
and financing barriers 
 Self-production not used 
as a strategy to cope with 
electricity crisis  
F. Exit  Constrained 
Irrigation water use rights are 
linked to land ownership; 
difficulties to rationalize 
water use rights   
 Constrained water use 
conservation 
Constrained 
Lack of sufficient monitoring by 
RBO of water sources other than 
reservoirs  
 Difficulties of long term 
adaptation by reallocating rights 
Constrained 
WUAs cannot contract for 
variable power term  
 Barrier to adapt to prices 
and demand 
Free  
Strategic behavior by fossil 
fuel generators despite 
regulations 
 Rise of prices in peak 
demand periods  
G. Information  Public 
Historical and real time 
information of water use 
processed by RAA 
organization. 
Effective implementation 
of quota policy 
 
Public 
Public registry of water use 
rights; real time information of 
water availability processed by 
RAA organization 




Public advertising of 
contract conditions by 
retailers processed by RAA 
organization; real time 
information of market prices 
 WUA collective 
bargaining  
Private  
Generators are not obliged to 
reveal their costs 
 Difficulties to rationalize 
production system and prices 
Note: green color: positive impact on adaptation; red color: negative impact on adaptation 
Appendix 5: Correlations among WUA features during 2005 drought  
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. % high water crops 1       
2. % low water crops -0.823* 1      
3. Farm size hetero† 0.258 -0.452* 1     
4. % small farms  -0.231   0.415* -0.985* 1    
5. Average farm size 0.345* -0.489* 0.929* -0.935* 1   
6. Transfer inflows  0.124 -0.308* 0.195 -0.169 0.232 1  
7. % sprinkler 0.192 -0.211 0.256* -0.485* 0.514* 0.312* 1 
 
n=38 (sampled from the 50 irrigation systems of the RAA project) 
†Farm size Heterogeneity is measured as a fractionalization index. The fractionalization index measures the 
chances that two random hectares in an irrigation district belong to a small farm (< 30 hectares) and to a big farm 
(>30 hectares) respectively. 
Note: as shown there is a strong correlation between the grow of high water-demand crops and the reliance on 
sprinkler irrigation during droughts (as well as on farm size and farm size heterogeneity). As pointed by 
interviewees, a relatively small number of big landowners who have recently invested in new land acquisitions, 
the mechanization of agricultural labor and sprinkler irrigation tended to stick to high-water demand crops, while 
a large number of part-time, small landowners tended to switch to lower demand crops and fallow land. 
 
 
